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Abstract 
With the development of technology and hardware, it has been assumed IoT(Internet of Things) society in the future that any 
device leads. In the automotive industry, in order to provide advanced services, such as automatic driving, any things are 
expected to lead the vehicle. In the IoT society, so that the lead is more than one system each other quality characteristics are
different, such as safety. For this reason, there is concern that trouble is generated from the difference in the attitude toward 
safety. In order to prevent the problem is to visualize the design quality of each other's systems, it is necessary to obtain a
common understanding among the developers. 
In this paper, as a technique to visualize the design quality of the system, to create a description document of automatic 
operation system using the GSN(Goal Structuring Notation), to be able to objectively explained on the basis of the assumption 
and evidence the validity of the design quality of each other's system Check. Upon confirmation, provide a description items to
be measures to hazards and threats that are expected in the relationship between the systems in automatic operation system, it 
showed the item should be explained to each other between the systems. 
Such description structure is standardized, if shared between systems, with the common understanding can be obtained 
between developers can predict the quality required for the product. As a result, it is considered to be able to prevent a problem
that occurs from the difference of the corporate culture. 
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1. Introduction  
In the future IoT society, in order to develop a high quality and safe system, it is essential to have obtained the common 
understanding for the quality and safety among the developers related to the development. For this purpose, it is necessary to 
document sufficient information capable of convincing the stakeholders and to visualize the design quality of the system. 
In this paper, for the target of automatic driving system, we will organize the products and stakeholders leading to the 
automatic driving system to create a document explaining the safety (validity of quality) of each product among the developers 
using the GSN. We will clarify the process for creating an explanation document, and consider the explanation document to be 
required in the future IoT society. Discusses related research in Section 2, describes the safety of the description procedure of
automatic driving system using the GSN in Section 3. We will add the discussions in Section 4, and finally make the summary 
and clarify the future challenges in Section 5. 
㻌
2. Related work 
Reference[1][5] describe notation of safety and dependability of the description document of the system. In this paper, we 
have adopted the GSN to the notation of the safety knowledge representation. 
Reference[1][10][14] proposes knowledge system related to safety or dependability, but it does not provide a way to describe 
the GSN. Reference[3][4][5][6] proposes the notation or patterns related to a safety argument. However, it does not describe the
relation between HAZOP(Hazard and Operability Studies), FTA(Fault Tree Analysis) and GSN. Reference[2][7][15] proposes 
the method combined HAZOP or FTA with D-Case(Dependability Case), but it does not describe the relation between HAZOP 
and FTA. Reference[8][9] shows the relation of safety analysis methods such as HAZOP, FTA, but it does not show the relation 
with GSN. Reference[11][12] proposes the method of generating safety case, but it does not describe concrete analysis methods 
such as HAZOP. Reference[13] proposes the method of generating D-Case based on Context Dependency Matrix. However, it 
does not consider about HAZOP and FTA. 
Any of the research, the applied case to the automatic driving system are not included. Therefore, in the system development 
in the future of the IoT society, the safety knowledge representation of automatic driving system shown in this paper is 
considered to be effective. 
3. Adopted safety analysis process 
Here, we describe the procedure for creating an explanation document that the developers involved in the development of the 
automatic driving system confirm the quality of each other's product and verify the quality of the entire system. 
(1) Define (Agree) the quality requirements the system should achieve. 
(2) Organize the context such as the configuration of the target system. 
(3) Confirm the quality of the system based on the context. 
3.1. Defining the quality requirements the system should achieve 
In the automatic driving system, various devices will be connected. Due to having been connected, threats such as the 
falsification of communication data are considered to increase. Furthermore, with the falsification or reception error of 
communication data, it is also conceivable that hazards may occur in the system. Here, hazard is due to the failure of internal
systems, the threat is that it is assumed that due to attack from outside (malicious third party), which measures both the internal
factors and external factors that impair the safety of the system, describing the quality of the entire system is appropriate: 
(A) Countermeasures against the possible hazards have been established. 
(B) Countermeasures against the possible threats have been established. 
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3.2. Organizing the context 
(1) Component devices and stakeholders of the automatic driving system 
 The actual automatic driving system is discussed that various devices will be connected, and many stakeholders are also 
involved in it, but this time, we consider a simple relationship as shown below. 
Fig. 1. Component devices and stakeholders of the automatic driving system 
(2) Hardware configuration of the automatic driving system 
For analyzing the possible hazards, we define the hardware configuration of the automatic driving system. Here, we show a 
configuration in which some of the hardware are omitted in accordance with the “collision prevention service of invisible people
and vehicle” to be described later. 
 Fig. 2. Hardware configuration of the automatic driving system 
(3) Services to be provided by the automatic driving system 
A list of services to be provided by the automatic driving system is shown in Table.1. To provide multiple services from one 
system, it is necessary to check the quality of each service. 
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Table 1. Providing services 
ID. Service ID. Service 
1. Collision prevention between invisible 
people and vehicle 
7. Start delay prevention 
2. Collision prevention when turning right or 
left
8. Securing the safety of passengers 
3. Rear-end collision and crash prevention 9. Securing the punctuality of public 
transportation
4. Sag part transportation facilitation 10. Overall optimization of public transportation 
5. Track convoy travel 11. Movement support of vulnerable road users 
6. Idling stop support 12. Crossing road accident prevention 
(4) Collision prevention service of invisible people and vehicle 
The specifications for the “Collision prevention with invisible people and vehicle”, one of the services to be provided by the 
automatic driving system, are shown below. 
[For vehicle drivers] 
 Using the following information to be obtained from the outside of vehicle, issues a warning by detecting the risk of 
collision in advance with invisible people and vehicle due to the wall and the like. Slows down the vehicle automatically 
as necessary. 
 Position information of pedestrians obtained from a smartphone 
 Vehicle position information obtained from the other vehicle 
 Risk avoidance information obtained via the roadside antenna from the Center 
[For pedestrians] 
 Using the vehicle position information transmitted from the vehicle, issues a warning by detecting the risk of collision in 
advance with invisible people and vehicle due to the wall and the like. 
(5) Life cycle of the services 
The behavior of the system will change according to the user's contract status. The behavior of the system for the contract 
status of the “Collision prevention with invisible people and vehicle” is shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. Life cycle of the services 
Service Life cycle Behavior 
Collision prevention 
with invisible people 
and vehicle 
When closing the 
service contract 
Sends the personal information such as name and vehicle 
ID to the Center to close the service contract. 
During the service 
contract
Provides the collision prevention services with other 
invisible vehicles and people due to the wall and the like. 
When terminating the 
service contract 
Terminates the service contract based on the contract and 
deletes the personal information stored in the Center. 
(6) Parameters transmitted and received between devices during the service contract 
A list of parameters transmitted and received between the products during the service contract of “Collision prevention with 
invisible people and vehicle” is shown Table 3. In the table, Tx and Rx represent transmission and reception, respectively. 
Table 3. Parameters between the devices 
Parameter Device 
Own vehicle Other vehicles Smartphone Roadside antenna Center 
Vehicle position information (own vehicle) Tx Rx Rx - - 
Vehicle position information (other vehicles) Rx Tx Rx - - 
Pedestrian position information Rx Rx Tx - - 
Risk avoidance information (Roadside antenna) Rx Rx - Tx - 
Risk avoidance information (Center) - - - Rx Tx 
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(7) Characteristics of the parameters between devices 
The parameters between devices can be divided into two types: “dynamic parameters” transmitted and received only when the 
devices have come close with each other within the communication distance and “static parameters” capable of always 
transmitting and receiving. The characteristics of the parameters between devices are shown in Table 4. 
Table 4. Characteristics of the parameters between devices 
Characteristics Definition 
Static The partner to transmit and receive has been statically decided, and the 
transmission and reception can always occur. 
Dynamic The partner to transmit and receive may change dynamically. 
The transmission and reception does not occur during the period when 
the partner to transmit and receive is not decided. 
3.3. Assure the system quality with the assumption. 
We assure the quality based on the assumption arranged in Section 3.2 while setting “the quality of automatic driving system 
is reasonable” as the highest goal㸬
We assure mainly by the following 3 procedures㸬
(1) Subdivide the goal per component for the automatic driving system. 
(2) Assure if a measure is established for a potential hazard of a parameter between devices (3.1(A)). 
(3) Assure if a measure is established for a potential threat of a parameter between devices (3.1(B)). 
(1) Subdivide the goal per components for the automatic driving system. 
Show the result after subdividing the goal per component for the automatic driving system as Fig.3. 
Analysis is conducted in the following sequence: 
[Step.1] Assure the quality over the system. 
Explain the quality of automatic driving system by subdividing per service which the automatic driving system provides. 
Actually, an explanation of the reasonability of quality between services will be required since several services simultaneously
operate however we assume that there is no interference between services in this case and explain only the quality of individual
service.
[Step2.] Assure the quality per service. 
We explain including a service “collision prevention between invisible people and vehicle”. In this service, the system 
behavior will be changed depending on three status of users such as before/after service contract or at the time of service contract,
under service contract, and at the time of termination of service contract. Accordingly, we explain per status which changes the
system behavior in order to explain that the service quality is reasonable. 
[Step.3] Assure the quality per service component. 
We explain including the status, “under service contract”㸬Services are composed of several devices and each device 
performs the cooperative behavior. In the world such as automatic driving service which can connect to several devices, we need
to explain the quality per device is reasonable as well as the quality of relationship between devices is reasonable. The quality per 
device should be assured by individual developer and we link the assurance result as evidence. Also, the normal function related
to the connection between devices should be assured by assuring the reasonability of quality per device. 
In addition, concerning the relationship between devices, we consider that each type of parameters is sent and received 
between devices in order to realize the service and assure that the quality of relationship between devices is reasonable by 
subdividing per parameter sent and received in this step. 
[Step.4] Assure the quality per parameter between devices. 
As explained above, we showed that we can subdivide into; assuring that the quality per system component device is reasonable 
and assuring that the quality per parameter between devices is reasonable when assuring the reasonability of service quality. We
actually assure the followings against sending and receiving a parameter in order to actually assure the reasonability of system
quality. 
࣭Safety: A measure is established for a potential hazard in sending and receiving a parameter. 
࣭Security: A measure is established for a potential threat in sending and receiving a parameter. 
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Fig. 3. Case for Explanation : Subdivide per service and system component. 
(2) Confirm measures to deal with expected hazards. 
We show the case for explanation to assure if a measure is established for a potential hazard as Fig.4. We now analyze the 
parameter of vehicle-position information sent and received between devices. 
Analysis is conducted in the following sequence: 
[Step.5] Description of what is measures hazard expected. 
Subdivide per hazard and assure if a measure is established for a potential hazard in sending and receiving a parameter 
between devices. We now explain including the vehicle-position information. 
In order to extract a hazard, we conduct HAZOP analysis by Guide Words. Guide Words included “No/More/Less/ 
As Well As/A Part Of/Other Than/Reverse/Delay/Late/Before/After”. 
We apply Guide Words to parameters to extract a potential hazard. We now assume that there is a period without any sending 
and receiving and a period with them since the vehicle-position information is a dynamic parameter as shown in Table.4. We 
show how we think about it as below. 
 How to consider a dynamic parameter at the time of extracting a hazard 
[Guide Word : Delay] 
 Vehicle as well as smartphones(pedestrians) may detect a vehicle position after they reached a position with high risk of 
collision since they are moving therefore the connection is “delayed”. 
=> Hazard : A vehicle detection is delayed and no warning appears on the smartphone. 
[Guide Word : No] 
 Even though the connection is established between vehicle and smartphone, the vehicle-position information “cannot be 
received”. 
=> Hazard : No warning appears when a vehicle is closing. 
 Both vehicles and smartphone is moving therefore the vehicle-position information “cannot be received” when they have 
a long distance each other. 
=> Hazard : None (It is normal not to receive a parameter and any undesirable situation will not occur.) 
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[Step.6] Analyze the damage factor against a hazard. 
We conducted FTA analysis against an extracted hazard by system structure and specify the damage factor. The following 
explanation shows a hazard, “no warning appears when a vehicle is closing since the smartphone cannot detect the closing 
vehicle”.
[Step.7] Assure if a measure is established for a damage factor. 
We consider a measure per damage factor extracted from FTA and explain to assure that a measure is established for a hazard 
by linking a record assuring that the measure is involved to a portion where the measure is required as evidence. 
(3) Confirm measures to deal with expected threats. 
Fig.5 shows an illustrative case of dealing with expected threats. Here, vehicle position information parameters which are sent
and received between devices are analyzed.  
Analysis is conducted in the following sequence: 
[Step.8] Description of what is measures threat expected. 
Regarding sending and receiving of parameters between devices, confirm that measures have been taken for expected threats 
by decomposing into individual threats. Here, explanation is given using vehicle position information.  
In order to identify threats, HAZOP analysis is conducted using Guide Words. For Guide Words, “Spoofing/ 
Falsification of data/Denial/Exposure of information/Service disabling/Promotion of authorization” are used. Moreover, since 
vehicle position data are dynamic parameters, identification of threats is conducted taking into consideration of their 
characteristics, as with hazards.  
[Step.9] Analysis on factors of threats. 
For the identified threats, FTA analysis is conducted using the system composition, to identify factors which give threats to the
system. In the explanation below, the threat that “A third party eavesdrops vehicle position information, and information such as
vehicle IDs is stolen” is taken up. 
[Step.10]Confirmation of measures to deal with the factors of threats. 
Examine measures for each factor of threats identified from FTA, and explain that measures have been taken to deal with 
threats by linking, as evidence, the record of confirmation that such measures are incorporated in the necessary places. 
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Fig. 4. Case for Explanation : Explanation of measures to deal with expected hazards 
Fig. 5. Case for Explanation : Explanation of measures to deal with expected threats 
4. Discussion 
In the illustrative case prepared this time, GSN is selected for the notation method. By visualizing, as preconditions, the 
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reasons to decompose the assertion in the upper ranks, it is expected that explanation will be easy to confirm and nonconformity
parts can be pointed out among developers of linked systems. 
Moreover, it is possible to derive from the structure of the case a framework to explain the appropriateness of quality of linked
systems. This framework has a possibility of becoming standardized because it consists of widely known techniques and those 
that are not dependent on industries. 
Next, techniques to be used for visualizing the preconditions of GSN will be examined. 
In the HAZOP analysis utilized to identify impediments, characteristics of parameters are defined to identify impediments 
caused by the characteristics of automatic driving system, and analysis is conducted taking into account the characteristics of
parameters when Guide Words are applied. On the other hand, while I have selected well-known standard Guide Words 
advocated by IPA and Guide Words from STRIDE which is a standard model for threat analysis, I think it will be necessary to 
discuss further as to whether Guide Words are sufficient to identify impediments of linked systems going forward.  
Moreover, in the FTA analysis on impediments, many of those that are expected from analysts’ experience in the industry 
have been identified for factors of failures as the results of analysis, including H/W failure of telecommunications IC and 
disconnection of telecommunication lines. In the FTA analysis as well, there is a possibility to visualize tacit knowledge in the
industry and analysts’ experiences by setting Guide Words such as “H/W failure” and “disconnection.”  
4.1. Limit of this process 
The explanatory process conducted in this article has the following limits: 
 It does not take into account interference among more-than-one services provided by the system 
 It limits the relation between devices to sending/receiving of parameters, and does not take into account positional relations.   
5. Conclusion 
In the system to realize automatic driving, more-than-one systems with different quality characteristics including safety are to
be linked, and therefore, failures are expected to occur due to different approaches to safety.  In order to prevent it, there is a 
possibility to standardize techniques to visualize the design quality of each other’s systems to gain mutual understanding among
companies. It has been confirmed that as techniques to visualize the design quality of systems, it is possible to prepare 
explanatory documents of automatic driving system, and explain objectively the appropriateness of each other’s design quality of
systems based on preconditions and evidence.     
At the time of confirmation, I set explanatory items on measures to deal with hazards and threats expected for the relationship
between products in the automatic driving system, and indicated items to be explained mutually between products.  I think that if
such explanatory structure is standardized and shared among companies, it will be possible to have common understanding 
among companies and predict the necessary product quality to link with the system in advance, and thereby prevent malfunctions 
from occurring due to differences in corporate cultures.   
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